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Introduction and Methodology 
This report provides an overview of Syrian migration to Turkey since the start of the revolt in Syria in 
March 2011. The number of displaced Syrians crossing the border into Turkey has dramatically risen 
with the escalating use of violence employed by the Syrian regime ito suppress the revolt. According 
to the United Nations Refugee Agency, 182,621 Syrian refugees were living in Turkey mid-February 
2013 (http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php). With the influx of huge numbers of Syrians 
into Turkey, anti-immigrant, anti-Arab discourses have surfaced among the Turkish public. 
Furthermore, due to the Turkish governments’ openly hostile position to the Syrian regime, Syrian 
migration became closely linked with Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy. Those individuals 
and political bodies critical of the Turkish government assumed an anti-immigrant position accusing 
displaced Syrians of being armed, sectarian rebels. Therefore, analyzing the Syrian migrant 
community in Turkey means contextualizing it within the political framework of the host-society. 
This study utilized qualitative research methods, conducting open-ended interviews with Syrian 
activists, Free Syrian Army members and collecting the life stories of displaced Syrians residing in the 
camps and in cities in Turkey. Fieldwork for this study is limited to the provinces of Gaziantep, Kilis, 
Islahiye, Hatay and Istanbul. 
Government hospitals in Gaziantep and Kilis, where wounded Syrians get treatment, were visited; 
doctors treating the Syrians were interviewed. Interviews with national and international organizations 
such as İHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation, a Turkish NOGO)), UNHCR, AFAD and Chambers of 
Commerce were conducted. Medical centers run by private donors and unofficial schools for Syrian 
children were visited. Government officials and camp administrators in Kilis and Islahiye were 
interviewed. Individuals from the local host communities were interviewed in order to get an 
assessment of the interactions between the Syrian and the local populations. 
Researchers, journalists, local and international organizations have been strictly banned from 
entering the camps even though the authorities seem to have relaxed this policy in the past few 
months. I had access to two camps: the container camp in Kilis and the tent camp in Islahiye. During 
my time in the camps, I had no chance to speak to Syrians since in both cases I was accompanied by 
the camp administrators who did not allow me to do so. However, I had external access to camp 
residents and talked to them freely while they were outside the camp.  
Number of Registered Syrians  
Following the crossing of about 250 Syrians into the Hatay region towards the end of April 2011, 
Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu held a meeting and announced that Turkey is ready to 
allow those Syrians in “who are not happy at home.” Following the regime’s violent attack against Jisr 
al Shughur, more than 7,000 Syrians arrived in Turkey in June, 2011. By early September 2011, 
Turkey had set up six refugee camps that were hosting about 7000 refugees. By December 2011, there 
were 8,000 registered Syrians. By 15 January 2012, the number had reached 9,500 and by the end of 
February 2012, it had almost reached 10,500. By mid April, 2012, the numbers had more than doubled 
to reach 24,000. By July 2012, there were 35,000 registered Syrians. This, then, shot up to 80000 by 
the end of August 2012. By mid-October, there were 100,000 and by mid-November, there were 
120,000 registered Syrians. The latest figure is for 156,000 registered Syrians in Turkey. These 
numbers do not include those Syrians who have rented apartments outside of camps, typically in cities. 
There are no reliable figures as to how many Syrians are residing in cities. Even though UNHCR 
states that 60,000-70,000 Syrians live in cities, my observations and interviews suggest a much higher 
number. In November 2012, the Turkish Interior Ministry passed a law that allows those Syrians who 
entered the country with passports to extend their stay to one year. The Turkish finance minister stated 
that the government spent 533 million Turkish lira to cover the needs of Syrians through 2012.  
Şenay Özden 
2 MPC-RR No.2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 
Currently there are 15 refugee camps, 13 of them tent cities and two container camps, in seven 
border provinces. Other than the border provinces, there are concentrations of Syrians in Istanbul, 
Ankara and Bursa.  
According to the latest figures of the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency 
(AFAD,14 January 2013 only in Turkish), the location and current capacity of the camps are as 
follows: 
Table 1. Numbers of Syrian refugees in camps in various provinces, mid-January 2013 
 
Source: Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency 
Meanwhile, the number of Syrian refugees living outside the camps has increased, and now 
possibly stands at more than 100,000 according to local estimates. Unregistered Syrian refugees are 
mostly located in Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa, which are all border provinces in Turkey. 
Numbers are very roughly estimated as 50,000 Syrians in Hatay, 30,000 in Kilis, 20,000 in Gaziantep 
and 20,000 in Sanliurfa. A detailed profiling of the movement patterns have not been conducted yet. 
According to Support to Life (www.supporttolife.org) assessments and the data obtained from local 
sources, the breakdown of the population is as follows: 
Kirikhan: Over 1,000 Syrian families according to local sources. Before 25 December, Kirikhan 
was hosting approximately 266 families (1,321 individuals) according to STL assessments. Therefore, 
it is estimated that Kirikhan district could now be hosting approximately 5,000 Syrian refugees. 
Reyhanli: According to local contacts in Reyhanli, the refugee population in the district has 
experienced dramatic increases since mid-December 2012. Before 15 December, the estimated 
number of Syrian refugees in Reyhanli was 15,000. The number of refugees is now estimated to be as 
high as 35,000 (6,000 to 7,000 families). 
Yayladağı: STL has assessed 305 families (1,586 individuals) in the Yayladagi district. Altinözü: 
STL has claimed 421 families (2,315 individuals). 
Antakya Centre: STL has estimated that there are only 58 families in Antakya city center, but this 
is because there are difficulties in tracking the families. Hence, STL suspects that there is a huge 
information gap with regard to the refugees in Antakya center. 
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Other: Local sources have confirmed the presence of Syrian refugees in Kumlu and Belen districts, 
where STL is not yet operational. Local sources note that in Kumlu there are 150 families (750 to 900 
persons). STL does not have information on the figures in Belen. 
According to www.supporttolife.org information, the breakdown of Syrians outside the camps are 
as follows: 
Table 2: Estimated numbers of Syrian refugees outside camps in various locations  
(January 2013) 
 
Source: www.supporttolife.org 
*STL has conducted only limited assessments in Reyhanli and Antakya, not covering all settlements. 
STL preliminary assessment figures indicate 2% of Syrian refugees in Turkey are infants (0-12 months), while 47% of 
refugees are children (under 18 years of age). 
Flight Stories:  
About 80% of the Syrians who fled to Turkey are from the northern provinces of Syria, mainly from 
Idlib, Latakia, Azaz and northern Aleppo even though there are smaller numbers of Syrians who fled 
from Damascus. Initially it was mostly political activist youth who fled to Turkey. Most of them live 
outside of the camps and stated that they had to flee because they were actively involved in the 
revolution and that their names were on the “black list” of the Syrian regime. They escaped from 
torture, imprisonment and persecution.  
As the violence of the regime increased and the humanitarian conditions in Syria worsened, Syrians 
started to flee in massive numbers. Many Syrians who fled after the first year of the revolution have 
stated that they had to flee due to the worsening humanitarian situation in their home country. Either 
their houses were bombed and demolished or they were living in areas targeted by the regime. 
Furthermore, they stated that there is no heating and that it is becoming more and more difficult to find 
basic supplies such as bread.  
Many Syrians have set out the role of kinship relations upon their arrival to Turkey. Especially in 
Kilis, where the economy is mostly based on smuggling, kinship relations have remained stronger over 
the years due to the economic relations across the borders. Many local residents of Kilis as well as 
displaced Syrians point at the importance of relatives as a pull factor for Syrians.  
The existence of relatives and business partners across the border on the Turkish side motivated 
many Syrians to flee to Turkey. Initially many were welcomed by their relatives. A Syrian who 
currently resides in Istanbul said: “When we reached the border near Urfa, we waited there for four 
days. The Turkish authorities were not letting us in. Then, once the Free Army liberated the border 
area, the Turkish authorities opened the border and let us in. We first went to the houses of our friends 
in Urfa. We had met them when they were in Syria for trade, my father works in the tourism sector, so 
he used to meet a lot of Turks who came to Syria for tourist or trade reasons. But how long can you 
stay at someone else’s home as guests? So after staying with them for a month, eventually we had to 
rent an apartment.”  
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A Syrian of Turkman origin stated: “I used to study at Aleppo University. Once the demonstrations 
started at the University, I was one of the people that the regime was looking for. So, I escaped to 
Turkey. I first stayed at a relatives’ house for a month. Then I came to Istanbul. I worked on construction 
sites and slept there for a couple of months until I had enough money to rent an apartment with friends.” 
Many others had to come to Turkey in order to get treatment at hospitals. Turkish ambulances 
waiting at the border to carry the wounded to the hospital closest to the border point. There are serious 
cases of injury, such as having lost one or more of the limbs, brain damage as well as less serious 
cases of injury. Some of the injured are members of the Free Syrian Army and state that as soon as 
they recover they will go back to Syria to fight. Non-combatants also voice their desire to go back to 
their homes and none have expressed any wish to stay in Turkey in the future. 
A Free Syrian Army fighter, who defected from the Syrian regime’s army and is currently in 
Gaziantep, explained about his decision to defect as follows: “My family’s only income was my 
salary. That is why I had to stay in the army. I was working in communications, so I was not in a 
position to directly kill my own people. If I was in such a situation, I would have defected from day 
one. But then I could no longer bear being part of an army that was killing my family, my friends and 
the people of my country. So, I made the decision to defect. As soon as I defected, I got in touch with 
the Free Syrian Army. After being interrogated, I joined the FSA. A month after joining the FSA, 
some shrapnel hit me in the eye and I had to come to Turkey for an operation. As soon as my 
treatment here is over, I will go back to Syria to continue to fight the regime.”  
A soldier defector from the regime who is currently in Hatay us about his flight: “We did not have 
permission to go visit our families for a year because most soldiers defect when they go to visit their 
families. Even talking on the phone with our families was forbidden. The only information we were 
getting about what is happening in Syria was through what the military was informing us. For a long 
time they were telling us that we were fighting Turkish and Israeli soldiers. After a year of not going 
home, I finally got the permission to visit my family and that is when I defected. I passed through the 
regime’s checkpoints with my brother’s ID card and contacted the FSA in Idlib. The FSA brought me 
to the Turkish border.”  
Some Syrians from bordering towns such as Azaz stated that they cross the border temporarily 
when bombings begin and that they go back to Azaz once the bombings stop. A Syrian from Azaz, 
who currently resides in Kilis, stated that, they used to wait under olive trees for 12 hours with nothing 
to eat except dry bread. After sunset, he stated, they would go back to their homes. After being stuck 
in this situation for weeks, they were able to enter Turkey.  
Many Syrians go back and forth between Turkey and their hometowns taking food and medicine with 
them into Syria and bringing back cheap cigarettes to sell in Turkey in order to make some money.  
Some Syrians have stated that the wealthy Syrians were able to leave Syria during the first stages 
of the revolution and that they, for the most part, rented apartments in big cities such as Istanbul or 
Gaziantep. The poor ones, they state, stayed in Syria longer until the situation became unbearable and 
now they are mostly in smaller and cheaper cities such as Kilis. Those who cannot afford to rent 
apartments are staying in the camps. They stated that the poorest segments of the Syrian society are 
still inside Syria since they do not even have the means to make it to the border.   
Many Syrians noted that in Turkey they are accused of being sectarian. In numerous instances they 
stated that until they reached the Turkish border, they hid in homes of friends from different sectarian 
backgrounds and that they also provided protection in their homes for Syrians from various sectarian 
backgrounds. They state that they are very uncomfortable with the accusation of being sectarian and 
that they feel like the Turkish public is trying to pull them into Turkey’s own sectarian issues. Many 
also point to the fact that they are aware of the reasons behind Turkish governments’ interest in Syria 
and that they understand that the Erdogan government is clearly supporting the Arab Sunni rebels. 
Syrian Refugees in Turkey 
MPC-RR No.2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 5 
 “Guest” Refugees: 
Even though Turkey is a signatory of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, Turkey’s 
asylum policy is characterized by the “geographical limitation” with which it implements the 
Convention. Turkey originally accepted the Convention with both the “time” and the “geographical” 
limitation. With the adoption of the 1967 Protocol, Turkey lifted the “time”, but kept the 
“geographical” limitation implying that the Turkish state grants refugee status and the right to asylum 
only to “persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe.” Asylum 
seekers from outside of Europe are assessed in cooperation with UNHCR. Such asylum seekers are 
granted temporary protection until a decision is reached. Those asylum seekers who are accepted as 
refugees are then resettled in a third country with the support of UNHCR. 
In line with the “geographical limitation” Syrians who have fled to Turkey are recognized as 
“guests” and not as “refugees;” and the camps where Syrians reside are officially “guest-camps,” not 
“refugee camps.” However, Syrians in Turkey are not treated like asylum seekers coming from other 
non-European countries, either. They cannot register with UNHCR in order to apply for asylum in a 
third country. Some Syrians who arrived Turkey in May 2011 have stated that UNHCR carried out 
initial interviews with them in order to start processing their files. However, later, due to a change of 
the policy by the Turkish state, UNHCR stopped registering Syrians. One of the interpretations of the 
change of policy by the Turkish government is that technically it is very difficult to process asylum 
applications for such a huge number of asylum seekers. Another commonly made comment by experts 
and journalists is that through such a policy, the Turkish government aims to prevent the interference 
of UNHCR or other international bodies in Turkish control over the Syrian migrant situation .  
Nevertheless, the Turkish state has implemented a “temporary protection regime” for Syrians. The 
principles of temporary protection are:  
i. An open border policy 
ii. No forcible returns (non-refoulement) 
iii. Registration with the Turkish authorities and support inside the borders of the camps.  
Officially, Syrians in Turkey are recognized not as refugees but as “guests.” Not being granted 
refugee status is an important factor that increases the vulnerability of Syrians who have fled their 
country for political and humanitarian reasons. Many Syrians have stated that their major complaint 
about the Turkish government is that they are not being granted refugee status and that “guest” status 
implies unpredictability about their presence in Turkey. The fear concerning the precariousness of their 
status is not unfounded. As a worker for one of the local authorities in Islahiye stated during my 
interview with him: “The guest status means that Syrians do not have rights in Turkey and that the State 
has the right to make the decision to deport them at any time.” In other words, the Turkish state has not 
carried out a policy towards Syrians based on a discourse of rights, but rather one based on “generosity.” 
Another official in Islahiye said: “Being a strong state means that you feel pity. The Turkish state feels 
pity towards Syrians and this is why we feed them and let them stay in Turkey.” Such a charitable 
approach rather than a rights-based approach also feeds negative public opinion in Turkey towards 
refugees. Many local people have expressed their discontent with the Turkish government allocating 
resources to Syrians instead of Turkish citizens who are in need, such as earthquake victims. Some of the 
words they use to define Syrians include “beggars”, “looters”, and “exploiters”.  
Even though one of the principles of temporary protection is an open-door policy for Syrians, 
during my presence in Kilis, I observed that Syrians were not always allowed into Turkish territory 
through the Kilis frontier. Those Syrians who have valid passports are allowed to enter the country at 
all times, whereas those without passports have difficulties. Many Syrians, who have this problem, 
enter Turkey through crossing the minefields between Turkey and Syria, risking their lives. There 
have been instances of the Turkish soldiers at the border region shooting at Syrians trying to enter 
Turkey irregularly and injuring some in the legs. This issue, however, has not attracted much attention 
in the Turkish media. 
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Another principle of the temporary protection policy is that there are no forcible returns. Certain 
sources such as UNICEF have declared that some Syrians went back to their country voluntarily. 
However, almost all the Syrians whom I have interviewed in the Islahiye camp stated that many camp 
residents are either going back or are thinking of going back to Turkey due to living conditions in the 
camps. “Above all, living in tent camps which are not ready for winter-conditions are forcing us to go 
back to Syria” stated one of the Syrians. Another Syrian said: “Because of the summer heat, babies 
died in the Urfa camp. So, we are forced to go back to Syria.” At the Kilis border crossing, I have 
observed Syrians being deported since they were not content with the conditions of the camp in which 
they were living. They wanted to be transferred to another camp, yet other camps were all full 
capacity. Thus, the authorities deported them.  
The Administrative Framework and the Camp Conditions 
Upon entering Turkey, Syrians are registered by the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management 
(AFAD) officials. Displaced Syrians then are taken to one of the refugee camps where they are given 
ID cards. The camps, which are run by the Turkish government in collaboration with AFAD and the 
Turkish Red Crescent, provide Syrians with access to services that cover the basic survival needs. 
Syrians staying in the camps receive free food and health care.  
UNHCR provides only technical support to the government for registration, identification of 
vulnerable groups and to adopt a community based approach in the camps. Since 2011, UNHCR has 
donated 28 million dollars in in kind assistance. As a sign of solidarity, UNHCR has also appealed to 
the international community to generate aid for displaced Syrian people.  
Even though many Syrians admit that the conditions of the Syrians in Turkey are much better than 
in Lebanon and Jordan, those residing in the camps have numerous complaints about camp conditions. 
Even though food is delivered three times a day, Syrians state that most of the time the food is not 
edible and that there have been numerous cases of food poisoning. Syrians have demanded that they 
be given the ingredients and they have said that they can then cook for themselves. However, the camp 
authorities have rejected this request, pointing to the danger of fire in tents. 
Syrians also have complaints about the distribution of basic goods such as soaps, toothpaste and 
baby food. Some state that the distribution is not fair and that families who are close to the camp 
administration receive goods while others do not. There has also been an account of Turkman families 
receiving more aid than Arab families. It is difficult to confirm or deny this claim though. Turkman 
families state that they do not receive any special treatment. Due to some tensions between Turkman 
and Arab Syrians, the Turkish government eventually established a separate camp for the Turkmans. 
This policy has been criticized by many on the grounds that it fuels sectarianism within Syrian society. 
Camp residents also have complaints about translators saying that they are mostly local peasants of 
Arab origin. They do not speak Arabic well enough to communicate specific terminology concerning 
serious issues such as health problems to doctors. Camp residents also state that even though all health 
costs are covered by the Turkish authorities, most of the time there is a delay in supplying medicine 
and that there are no specialists, just general doctors.  
Complaints have increased with the winter. Many Syrians have remarked that the tents are not 
suitable for winter weather and that are flooded each time that there is rain. As a result, some Syrians 
have decided to go back to Syria even though their lives are under threat. As one of the residents of the 
Islahiye camps stated: “The only reasons why we endure these awful conditions in the camp is that 
there are no planes bombing us from above.” Another camp resident has voiced his criticism of the 
camp conditions by saying that “The camp conditions are great if you don’t mind living like animals, 
but if you want to live like a human, the conditions are unacceptable.”  
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A camp resident said “We are in between two fires in Turkey. As displaced people we are in a 
vulnerable situation so we cannot voice our complaints to the Turkish authorities. Because we do not 
have refugee status they can decide to deport us at any time.” 
Another resident said how “There are no clear rules and regulations communicated to us 
concerning the camp. We have seen corruption among the Turkish authorities.” 
Camp residents have elected committees in order to voice concerns and complaints to the Turkish 
authorities. However, they state that the Turkish authorities do not take the opinions expressed by the 
committee into consideration at all.  
In the Kilis camp, the Turkish authorities have opened nurseries and primary and secondary schools 
where they have adopted the curriculum of the Turkish Ministry of Education. In other camps, such as 
the Islahiye camp, Syrians have organized and established a school themselves where Syrian teachers 
residing in the camps do the teaching. There are 30 teachers and 710 students. One of the teachers states 
that “it took a lot of effort to persuade the Turkish authorities to let Syrians do the teaching.” 
Some Syrians had complaints about the presence of Turkish soldiers at the camp gates. The soldiers 
are not allowed to walk around in the camp, but they are responsible for the security at the entrance. 
Besides hearing stories from Syrians residing in the camps, I have also observed that soldiers sometimes 
treat the Syrians in a non-humanitarian fashion, for example, insulting them, shouting at them and 
waving their guns at them. Camp residents argue that the presence of armed soldiers have negative 
psychological effects, especially for children, who have witnessed and escaped from violence in Syria. 
The general perception is that wealthier Syrians prefer to rent apartments in the cities rather than to 
stay in the camps. Even though there is definitely a class division among Syrians living in the camps 
and living in the cities, it is important to note that there is a big number of Syrians outside the camps 
who are living in poverty. Even some who are able to rent apartments run out of money after a few 
months and have to find ways of surviving in the city. Some families live in mosques or in parks.   
Employment of Syrians  
30 January, 2013, nine workers, two of whom were displaced Syrians, died as a result of an explosion 
at a galvanization factory in Gaziantep. The death of Syrian workers who were being employed at the 
factory without work permits brought the plight of displaced Syrians to the attention of the Turkish 
public. Even though it is not possible to have statistics regarding how many Syrians are being 
employed without any work permits and thus without any work benefits, interviews with Syrians and 
some local businessmen prove that increasing numbers of Syrians are forced to work under 
exploitative conditions, with their lives at risk. After the explosion, Fatma Şahin, Minister of Social 
Policy, stated that the government is aware of the fact that Syrian workers are being employed without 
work permits and that the government will solve this problem. She stated that Syrians are now able to 
get residency and soon will be able to get work permits as well.  
Seasonal workers: Neither those Syrians in the camps or those residing in towns and cities are yet 
granted the right to work. However, once they started running out of the savings they brought with 
them, many had to start working in restaurants, factories, construction sites and as farm workers 
without social security or other benefits. Some Syrians have stated that they work in order to save 
money so that they can rent apartments and move out of the camp during the winter. However, it is 
impossible to pay rent on the wages that they are making. The average salary is 15 Turkish lira (less 
than 7 euros) per day.  
I interviewed Syrians in the Islahiye camp who are working in pepper farms and factories as 
seasonal workers. Most are men but there are also a number of children and women working in farms 
and factories. Many of the workers are over qualified for the jobs they are doing; so we have law 
school and business school graduates picking red peppers. Many Syrians state that farm and factory 
Şenay Özden 
8 MPC-RR No.2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 
owners exploit Syrian workers due to their vulnerable situation. They also claim that employers prefer 
to employ Syrians over local workers since they are cheaper. This view has credibility as one of the 
factory owners I interviewed said: “Thanks to Bashar al Asad, we now have cheap labor.” Not only 
are the Turkish authorities not taking any precautions against the exploitation of refugee labor, they 
are actually indirectly encouraging it. Even though initially Islahiye camp residents were not allowed 
to leave the camp, once the red pepper season approached, they were allowed to stay outside the camp 
from 9am to 5pm. Early in the morning, there are hundreds if not thousands of Syrians standing in 
front of the camp, waiting to be picked to go to work in farms and factories. One of the officials in the 
Islahiye said: “We allow them to work for a few reasons. First, they are bored in the camp; by working 
they keep themselves busy. Second, factory owners prefer to employ Syrians since the usual seasonal 
workers from Urfa are difficult to deal with for the factory owners. However, Syrians have to do what 
the factory owners order them to do.”  
Educational Opportunities: The Turkish government stated that Syrian university students are 
allowed to enroll at seven universities in the border cities without having to show proof that they used 
to attend universities in Syria. This policy has resulted in anti-immigrant discourses among the 
Turkish public accusing the Syrians of stealing educational opportunities from Turkish students. 
Furthermore, it will be mostly Turkman Syrians who will be able to attend universities because of 
language constraints: Arab Syrians will obviously have greater problems in this respect. Therefore, 
this policy has been criticized for positively discriminating the Turkman population.  
Syrian Displacement and Influences on the Turkish Economy  
Gaziantep: An official visit of the Syrian Prime Minister, Nal, al Otari to Turkey in July 2004, marked 
the beginning of the relations between the Syrian State Planning Commission and the Turkish State 
Planning Organization. A regional cooperation program between the two countries was suggested as a 
result of this visit and the budget of the program was set at 20 million USD to be funded equally by 
the two countries. Subsequently, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Syrian authorized 
office approved a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a framework of cooperation. The first 
meeting of the regional Cooperation Program Monitoring and Steering Committee was held in 
Gaziantep in April 2005, during which a Joint Program Document was approved. The documents 
outlined agreements concerning the funding and application of infrastructure, technical cooperation, 
capacity developments, culture and tourism projects. The Project Coordination Unit, which has the 
tasks of implementing the projects, was established in Gaziantep in June 2006. Officials from the 
Project Coordination Unit have stated during my interviews that they had closer links with the 
businessmen of Aleppo rather than those of Damascus since Damascus businessmen have closer 
relations with the regime and thus benefit more from the “old structure.” They have also stated that the 
situation in Syria did not have a drastic influence on the economy of Gaziantep since Gaziantep 
businessmen were able to redirect their trade to Libya and Egypt. They have also stated that Gaziantep 
has stronger business relations with Iraq and that if such a crisis was to take place in Iraq, then the 
Gaziantep economy would have collapsed. 
Due to the stabilization of relations between Turkey and Syria under the AKP government, many 
businessmen moved their factories into Syria where labor is cheaper compared to Turkey. An example 
is the Tekerekoğlu textile company which was moved to the Aleppo region in 2007 after a labor strike 
in Gaziantep. Local businessmen state that the situation in Syria had a catastrophic influence on those 
businesses that had factories operating inside Syria. 
Non-Governmental Organizations and Assistance to Displaced Syrians 
İHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation: Turkish authorities have been very strict about not allowing any 
independent observers, journalists, NGOs, national or international humanitarian relief organization to 
Syrian Refugees in Turkey 
MPC-RR No.2013/05 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 9 
enter the camps. However, Syrian accounts reveal that since the early days of the establishment of the 
camps, İHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation had access to the camps. The exclusive İHH presence in 
the camps have been criticized by many based on the argument that the Turkish government is giving 
access to İHH since it is ideologically close to the government.  
İHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation has been the major foundation undertaking relief efforts for 
Syrians outside the camps since March 2011. İHH has provided Syrians with basic necessities such as 
shelter, food and healthcare. IHH has been distributing child and baby food packages, clothes, hygiene 
packages, wheel chairs, crutches, first aid kits, prayer sets including Qurans, prayer beads as well as 
linen, pillows, and blankets. Shelter aid items such as tents, containers, mats and blankets have also 
been distributed. According to the information I got from İHH, aid is being delivered through the IHH 
Coordination offices in Kilis and Reyhanlı border regions. 45% of the aid has been distributed to 
Syrians in Turkey and in the other bordering countries and 55% has been distributed inside Syria.  
In June 2011, IHH set up a mobile kitchen that provides hot meals for 12,000 people on a daily 
basis. IHH officials also visited Syrian refugees being treated at various hospitals, provided them with 
medicine and helped with the transfer of some patients to other hospitals outside Antakya to receive 
better treatment. IHH helped too with the transfer of patients discharged from hospitals to the camps. 
IHH had a health truck providing services on the Bab al-Hawa frontier and another one on the Bab al-
Salam Gate on the Syrian side of the Kilis Öncüpınar Border Gate. The health truck examined 70-80 
displaced Syrians daily and distributed medicine.  
IHH also carried out relief efforts on the Lebanese-Syrian border since May 2011. Inside Syria, 
IHH has been undertaking relief activities for internally-displaced Syrians and Palestinians.  
Other than providing humanitarian relief, IHH also has been raising the issues of human rights 
violations in Syria at the national and international level. For example, İHH attended the meetings of the 
Syrian Humanitarian Aid Forums held in Geneva, 16 July 2012 under the auspices of the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA). IHH also attended conventions organized with 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Arab League and the Humanitarian Forum. 
Kimse Yok Mu (KYM) is a Turkish Non-Governmental Organization. KYM delivers humanitarian 
aid to Syrian refugees mostly in Jordan and Lebanon based because whereas the Turkish government 
is “fully mobilized for refugees, Syrians are in a difficult situation in Lebanon and Jordan.” After 
negotiating with the local authorities in Jordan, KYM donated 5.5 tons of relief supplies to Syrian 
refugees there. Inside Turkey, KYM donated food, clothing and blankets to 12,000 people in Antakya 
and to 2,000 people in Kilis. Furthermore, KYM built portable toilets, bathrooms, garbage containers 
and plays areas in Kilis. KYM also has a mobile kitchen in Gaziantep where hot food is served to 
1,000 Syrians on a daily basis. KYM also opened a health care center in region in September 2012 
which is staffed by two Syrian doctors, two nurses and two pharmacists.  
Caritas started a year-long programme 1 January 2013 on the border districts of Kilis and Reyhanlı. 
Caritas is appealing for 1,406,801 Euros. Caritas will provide food, hygiene items, blankets and 
heaters to 2000 families. Caritas will also provide Syrians with medical assistance and counselling.  
Civil society organizations in Diyarbakır gathered under “Diyarbakır Brotherhood Initiative for 
Syria” to launch an aid campaign. Organizations such as Özgür-Der, Ay-Der, the Anatolia Youth 
Foundation, Humanitarian Relief Association, Memur-Sen, Association to Protect the Values of 
Diyarbakır and İhvan-Der were all represented in this initiative. Speaking on behalf of the organizations, 
Hasip Yokuş stated that it is an Islamic and humanitarian duty to side with oppressed people. 
İston, a construction company in Istanbul, has also announced its support for displaced Syrians and 
sent 1,540 blankets to Kilis to be delivered to Syrians. 
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Because the Turkish authorities refused permission to Doctors Without Borders to operate on 
Turkish territory the organization had set up field hospitals on the Syrian side of the border. Recently, 
however, they received the necessary permit and are currently preparing to open a clinic in Kilis.  
Until about September 2012, Turkish authorities were not allowing relief initiatives by Syrian 
individuals or organizations. With the drastic increase in the number of Syrians, however, it became 
more difficult for the Turkish authorities to meet all the needs. The Turkish authorities are now then 
allowing Syrians to cooperate with Turkish NGOs to open humanitarian aid centers, schools and 
health centers. In Antakya and Gaziantep, Syrians have established their semi-official schools, with 
Syrian teachers who developed their own curriculums.  
It is important to note that most of the non-governmental organizations provide aid to those Syrians 
residing outside the camps, whereas the Syrians in the camps are totally isolated and survive on what 
the Turkish government provides them with.  
Hatay  
Of all the cities where there are camps or a concentration of Syrian population living outside the 
camps, Hatay deserves to be analyzed as a special case because of tensions between the local 
population and the Syrians. Hatay, which became part of Turkey after a referendum in 1939, has been 
one of the major issues of dispute between Syria and Turkey. Syria has claimed that the referendum 
was “suspicious”, with Turkey moving Turks into the Hatay region right before the vote. Syria claims 
that Hatay was illegally taken by Turkey and that it violates the unity of Syrian territory. From 2000, 
when Bashar Assad came to power in Syria, there was a lessening of tension between Turkey and 
Syria over Hatay. The Syrian government no longer atively claimed Hatay, though it had not given up 
its claim either. The population of Hatay is divided almost equally between Sunni Muslims and Alawi 
Muslims with an Arab Orthodox Christian minority. The city has remained predominantly Arab.  
There have been reports of complaints about Syrians living in Hatay since July 2011. Some of the 
initial complaints did not target the Syrians themselves, but rather the Turkish government’s choice of 
camp space. Locals stated that the camps were built on grassland, creating problems for the grazing of 
their animals. Later, however, criticisms started directly to target Syrians.  
i. Economic Dimension: Complaints at the economic level can be categorized as the kind of 
anti-immigrant discourse which is prevalent in many locations where there has been a huge 
influx of migrants. The local population criticized the presence of Syrians living in the city 
based on the argument that they are causing inflation in rent prices. This criticism was 
common in other cities such as Kilis and Gaziantep, as well. However, some also voiced the 
view that it was the real estate owners who should be criticized for raising the rents and 
exploiting Syrians who are in a difficult position to start with. Another complaint at the 
economic level is that Syrians have become competitors in the labor market and they are 
causing the lowering of wages. Once again, some locals I interviewed criticized employers 
rather than Syrians by saying that employers are exploiting refugee labor. 
ii. Cultural differences: Many local residents of Hatay expressed complaints based on 
“differences between the urban culture of Hatay and the peasant, non-urban, uneducated 
background of Syrians,” as they put it. Many accused Syrians of not having manners, 
speaking and laughing very loudly, being uneducated, having too many children, and 
harassing women on the streets. At times this kind of talk bordered on hate speech towards 
Syrians. There were even instances of institutionalized discrimination such as not allowing 
Syrians to sit at the front tables at a café in the city center.  
iii. Violation of Law: Many locals have stated that Syrians refuse to pay bills at restaurants and 
supermarkets, and that they do not pay their rents. They have added that when asked to pay 
the bills, Syrians either threaten them or say “Go ask from your prime minister; he will pay 
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the bill.” I found it very difficult to confirm the validity of these complaints since every 
single person who expressed this complaint also stated: “I never saw it with my own eyes, 
but family and friends say so.” Therefore, it is perhaps most important to understand why this 
kind of story circulates among the local public. It is also important to note that the media 
also had a role in circulating and legitimizing such a discourse by telling such stories and 
incidents without giving references; thus reproducing an anti-immigrant discourse and 
strengthening anti-immigrant public opinion. 
iv. Services: Both in Hatay and Kilis, many locals have complainted that they no longer have 
access to immediate treatment at hospitals since hospitals are overcrowded by Syrians. They 
argue that doctors have been ordered by the government to give priority to the treatment of 
Syrians. Although it is true that there are many cases of wounded Syrians arriving in 
hospitals on a daily basis, there is no centralized order to give all Syrians priority. Since 
many Syrians come from a war zone, it is most likely that they are emergency cases that 
need immediate intervention in order for the patient to survive. 
v. Militarization of the camps and the city: Many locals have expressed their concern about the 
presence of armed Syrians in the camps and in the city. They have stated that most of the 
Syrians are not innocent refugees or victims of war, but rather they are Islamic militants and 
Jihadists. Migrants’ The long beards and the style of dress are given as proof. Locals argue 
that neither the camps nor the apartments rented by Syrians in the city are family homes. 
Rather, they are military bases where Syrian and non-Syrian armed groups stay and get 
military training. However, according to my interviews with the local authorities in Altınözü, 
for example, there are 200 Syrians living in 30 houses and there are not more than two males 
in each household. Also my interviews with the Syrian women and elderly residing both in 
the camps and in the city show that the apartments rented by Syrians are family homes. They 
are not bases for militants.  
vi. During interviews, the locals from Hatay expressed their discontent with the non-transparent 
policies of the Turkish government and their fear of collaboration between the Erdoğan 
government and the Sunni Syrian rebels. Hatay has a delicate balance of Alewite and Sunnis 
and the Alewite residents of Hatay have openly stated that they had considered the Alewite 
Asad regime of Syria a safe haven if they face trouble in Turkey. Therefore, they state that 
the uprising in Syria is actually a conspiracy of the Turkish government and the Syrian Sunni 
opposition against the Alewites.  
vii. Apaydın camp: AKP government’s refusal to allow members of the main opposition party, 
CHP, to enter the Apaydın camp, popularly known as the “camp of the generals,” in August 
2012 resulted in an increase in tensions in Hatay. Media and organizations critical of the 
Turkish government’s Syria policies argued that Turkey easily allows Al Qaeda militants to 
enter Syria through Turkish soil. Both CHP and the Hatay public had suspicions that the 
Apaydın camp was being used for training armed rebels. The Turkish government claimed 
otherwise and stated that Apaydın camp houses defecting soldiers, but that there is no 
military training in the camp. Eventually the government had to agree to let visitors enter the 
camp under the condition that permits were cleared with the Foreign Ministry. The 
parliament members who entered the camp found no weapons inside.  
viii. I interviewed two residents of the camp from Idlib who had defected from the Syrian army and 
had fled to Turkey with their families. They stated that only about 30% of the camp population 
(around 600 individuals) are ex-soldiers and that the rest are the families of the same. One of 
the Apaydın residents told us that the Free Syrian Army brought him to the border where the 
Turkish military jeeps picked him up and took him to the camp. He also stated that since his 
defection put all his family’s lives in danger, all his sisters and brothers also had to escape and 
come to Turkey. The second Apaydın camp resident I interviewed stated that weapons are not 
allowed in the camp. Defected soldiers leave their weapons at the border before they cross onto 
Turkish soil. Residents of the Apaydın camp can only leave the camp for emergency health 
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situations and to go to the market once a week on Wednesdays. In both cases, the Turkish 
military jeeps take them back and forth between the camp and the city. Camp residents state 
that this policy is being enacted in order to ensure the security of residents.  
Anti-War Campaigns and Conclusion 
In early October 2012, mortar shells from Syria hit the town of Akçakale on the Syrian border and 
killed five Turkish citizens. Following the incident, 4 October, 2012, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly passed a motion that authorizes the government to deploy armed forces in foreign countries. 
In the hours following the vote in the Grand Assembly, there were massive demonstrations in various 
cities in Turkey. The demonstrators criticized the motion for the deployment of armed forces and 
accused the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) of trying to pull Turkey into a war 
against Syria; a war which was not, according to the demonstrators, Turkey’s war, but that of global, 
imperial powers. Many critics argued that the AKP’s policy towards Syria expressed the Turkish 
government’s collaboration with Western imperial powers against Syria and the Turkish prime-
minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s desire to resurrect the Ottoman Empire. Many also state that the 
AKP’s support of the Syrian rebels is a sign of the Turkish government’s anti-Alawite policies. 
Syrians, however, in many instances, have declared that the revolution did not start with sectarian 
aims. As one of the Syrians in Hatay stated: “In Turkey they accuse us of being sectarian. The 
revolution is against the brutal regime, it has never been against the Alawis. Sunni and Alewis used to 
live together in Syria. Syrians are not fundamentalists. We are fighting against the Bath regime and 
after the fall of the regime, if fundamentalist come to power, we will fight against them, as well.”  
Many Syrians have also spoken concerning the AKP’s support for Islamist powers, such as the 
Nusra Front, in Syria: “If the international community had spoken out against the brutalities of the 
regime and had supported the people against the regime, the Nusra front would not be present in 
Syria today. The longer this war continues the stronger the Nusra front will get because they know 
how to fight. But, it does not mean that we will accept their rule in Syria after the regime falls. We 
will spend years rebuilding our country. Not only the buildings, homes, mosques and churches 
which are destroyed, but our society needs to be rebuilt. We will fight against all political forces – 
internal and foreign – that try to rule us by force and against our dignity. We want a Syria where 
every Syrian has equal rights.”  
Many Syrians have argued that it is not the Syrian people, but the regime, which has fuelled 
sectarianism in Syria. A displaced Syrian from Homs, who is currently residing in Hatay, tells about 
the role of the regime in creating sectarianism: “It is the Syrian regime and external powers which 
benefit from sectarianism. Therefore, together with the regime, the Salafis will also collapse because 
both have the same interests: to control our people, politics and the capital. In Homs, the 
demonstration started first in a village where the Sunni, Alwaites, Ismailis and the Murshidis live 
together. Then we had a demonstration in the city of Homs on 23 March, 2011. Our slogan was “down 
with the governor!” The authorities immediately used tear gas against us. Then on 26 March, one 
person was shot during a demonstration. This triggered even bigger demonstration. People had the 
feeling “If someone is killing me, then it means I am right.” Once the demonstration got bigger, the 
regime started to establish checkpoints between Sunna, Alawite and Christian villages in order to 
create sectarianism. While our slogans were “Freedom, Fredeom, Christians and Muslims together for 
Freedom”, the regime was creating sectarianism by trying to inflict fear among the Christians and the 
Alawites that the Sunni want to kill them. The regime itself killed Alawis and told them that the 
Sunnis killed them and also killed Sunnis and told them that the Alawites killed them. “ 
Very few of the demonstrators and critics denounced the extreme violence used by the Asad regime 
while criticizing the policies of the Turkish government. The failure to say “No to Asad” by most of 
the opposition in Turkey meant Syrians criticised these movements. Many of the Syrian activists I 
have interviewed have expressed their concern that they are being exploited and being pulled into the 
internal politics of Turkey.  
